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____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
____________ 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises out of a dispute at the Sapphire 
Beach Resort and Marina on the island of St. Thomas.  The 
case pits a condominium association against its initial sponsor 
and some of the sponsor’s creditors.  The District Court for 
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the Virgin Islands ordered the parties to arbitrate their 
dispute.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand. 
I 
 The Sapphire Beach Resort and Marina Condominium 
Association, LLC (Condominium Association) was initially 
sponsored by Bayside Resort, Inc. in 1998.  The declaration 
of condominium (Declaration) required Bayside to provide 
fresh water and wastewater treatment services to the 
Condominium Association at a reasonable rate to be 
determined by several factors.  The Declaration also made all 
of the water facilities common property of the Condominium 
Association. 
 In 1999, Bayside contracted with TSG Technologies, 
Inc. and TSG Capital, Inc. (collectively, TSG) to construct, 
operate, and maintain a water treatment system to fulfill its 
obligation under the Declaration to provide potable water to 
the members of the Condominium Association.  From the 
contract’s inception until 2005, TSG charged Bayside 
approximately $0.02 per gallon of potable water. 
 By 2001, Bayside became delinquent in its obligations 
to creditors.  The financial situation worsened and, by early 
summer of 2005, Bayside owed millions of dollars to various 
creditors including TSG, the Condominium Association, and 
its members.  In addition to the aforementioned unsecured 
creditors, Bayside owed more than $9 million to Beachside 
Associates, LLC, which held a mortgage on some of 
Bayside’s property and had already filed a foreclosure action. 
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 In the summer of 2005, Bayside, TSG, and Beachside 
reached an agreement pursuant to which Bayside assigned to 
TSG its exclusive right under the Declaration to supply water 
to the Condominium Association.  The agreement permitted 
TSG to increase the price of water from $0.02 per gallon to 
$0.05 per gallon, which would generate a windfall that TSG 
could use to pay down the debt of Bayside before paying any 
remainder to Bayside’s secured lender, Beachside.  Under this 
plan, TSG could be paid ahead of Bayside’s secured creditors 
while Beachside could recover some of its debt as well. 
 Before the agreement could be implemented, however, 
the Condominium Association had to consent to Bayside’s 
assignment of its water provision rights to TSG.  To obtain 
that consent, Bayside and TSG threatened to cease providing 
water and wastewater treatment services to the Condominium 
Association’s members even though it was not feasible for 
them to obtain those services elsewhere. 
 Yielding to those threats, the Condominium 
Association’s Board signed a water supply agreement (Water 
Supply Agreement) and consented to the assignment of the 
water provision rights to TSG.  The Water Supply Agreement 
not only required the Condominium Association to pay $0.05 
per gallon of water, but also provided that Bayside, rather 
than the Condominium Association, owned all of the water 
facilities except for a water plant.  The Water Supply 
Agreement also contained an arbitration clause. 
 After 2005, TSG continued to threaten to shut off the 
Condominium Association’s water unless it paid $0.05 per 
gallon.  In January 2006, after not receiving the payment 
mandated by the Water Supply Agreement, TSG temporarily 
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stopped producing potable water for the Condominium 
Association. 
 In March 2006, the Condominium Association filed 
suit in the District Court of the Virgin Islands against 
Bayside, TSG, and Beachside, asserting five claims.  Count 
One alleged that Defendants committed criminal extortion in 
violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO).  Count Two alleged that Bayside and TSG 
breached their obligations under the Declaration.  In support 
of this claim, the Condominium Association claimed the 2005 
Water Supply Agreement was void both because it was 
coerced and because its Board lacked the authority to sign it.  
(Count Four sought a declaratory judgment voiding the Water 
Supply Agreement on the same grounds).1
 In April 2006, all three Defendants filed separate 
motions to dismiss, claiming, inter alia, that the case had to 
be arbitrated pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Water 
Supply Agreement.  Finding all five counts of the complaint 
within the scope of the arbitration clause, the District Court 
  In Count Three, 
the Condominium Association sought a declaratory judgment 
that it owned the water treatment systems and associated 
facilities.  Finally, in Count Five, the Condominium 
Association sought specific performance of the Declaration, 
i.e., an order compelling Bayside to convey its water system 
to the Condominium Association. 
                                                 
1 To maintain consistency with the District Court’s 
opinion and the parties’ submissions, we will refer to the 
Condominium Association’s argument that the Board lacked 
the authority to enter into the Water Supply Agreement as the 
ultra vires argument. 
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granted Defendants’ motions, dismissed the complaint, and 
entered an order compelling arbitration.  In addition, the 
District Court rejected the Condominium Association’s ultra 
vires argument on the merits with respect to Count Two, but 
referred both Count Two as a whole, and the Condominium 
Association’s same ultra vires argument with respect to 
Count Four, to arbitration.  The Condominium Association 
appealed.2
 We review the District Court’s order de novo.  See 
Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009).  
We review any factual findings the District Court made in 
interpreting the relevant contract for clear error.  See State 
 
II 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the RICO claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 48 U.S.C. § 
1612(a) and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
even though the District Court’s order compelled arbitration.  
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 45–46 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
                                                 
2 Bayside and Beachside also filed a cross-appeal, No. 
07-2678.  However, on August 17, 2012, their counsel 
advised that he would move to dismiss the cross-appeal for 
mootness although no such motion was filed.  In any event, 
Bayside and Beachside abandoned their cross-appeal by not 
addressing it in their opening brief.  See Free Speech Coal., 
Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 545 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Therefore, we will dismiss the cross-appeal.  See Seufert 
Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198 (1919). 
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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coviello, 233 F.3d 710, 713 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  The District Court’s order compelling arbitration 
is treated as a summary judgment, so the “party opposing 
arbitration is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and 
inferences that may arise.”  Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 620 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Only when there is no genuine 
issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement 
should the court decide as a matter of law that the parties did 
or did not enter into such an agreement.”  Par-Knit Mills, Inc. 
v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., Ltd., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
III 
 The Condominium Association’s ultra vires argument 
is not arbitrable and must be decided by the District Court.  
Under the Prima Paint rule, if a contract contains an 
arbitration clause, challenges to the validity of the contract as 
a whole are for the arbitrator to decide.  See Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 
(1967).  But challenges to the formation of a contract are 
“generally for courts to decide.”  See Granite Rock Co. v. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2855–56 (2010); see 
also Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 
n.1 (2006) (distinguishing between challenges to a contract’s 
validity and challenges to its formation). 
 We have held that a challenge to a contract on the 
grounds that the signatory was unauthorized to sign it must be 
decided by a court, even if the contract contains an arbitration 
clause, because it is a challenge to a contract’s formation 
rather than its validity.  Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 
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F.3d 99, 100–01 (3d Cir. 2000).3
 The District Court rejected the Condominium 
Association’s ultra vires argument with respect to Count Two 
based on the fact that the Board approved the Water Supply 
Agreement.  In doing so, the District Court erred by 
conflating the authority of the Condominium Association 
itself with the more limited authority of its Board.  Under the 
Condominium Association’s by-laws, the Board “shall have 
the powers and duties necessary for the administration of the 
affairs of the Condominium and may do all such acts and 
things except those which by law or by the Declaration or by 
  Sandvik teaches that the 
court must adjudicate any claim that a contract was beyond a 
signatory’s authority or ultra vires, even if that contract 
contains an arbitration clause.  Therefore, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order compelling arbitration so it can first 
decide the ultra vires argument on the merits. 
A 
                                                 
3 Our approach is consistent with five of the six other 
courts of appeals to have addressed this issue.  See Solymar 
Invs., Ltd. v. Banco Santander S.A., 672 F.3d 981, 989–90 
(11th Cir. 2012); Telenor Mobile Commc’ns. AS v. Storm 
LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 406 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009); Banc One 
Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 429–30 (5th Cir. 
2004); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 
587, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2001); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. 
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 
1991); but see Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Lawrence Cnty. v. L. 
Robert Kimball & Assocs., 860 F.2d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(arbitrators can decide ultra vires challenge); cf. Koch v. 
Compucredit Corp., 543 F.3d 460, 464 (8th Cir. 2008) (court 
can decide challenge to whether a contract was assigned). 
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these By-Laws may not be delegated to the Board of 
Directors.” 
 One of the Declaration’s limitations is that it “may be 
amended by the vote of at least 67% in common interest of all 
Unit Owners, cast in person or by proxy at a meeting duly 
held in accordance with the provisions of the By-Laws.”  This 
straightforward provision requires a 67% vote before the 
Declaration may be amended and Appellees do not argue that 
the Board even sought, much less obtained, the requisite vote.  
Whether such a vote was necessary turns on whether the 
Water Supply Agreement constituted an amendment to the 
Declaration. 
 The Condominium Association argues that the Water 
Supply Agreement amended the Declaration in two respects: 
(1) by changing the rates charged for water; and (2) by 
converting an individual expense into a common charge. 
 As for the first argument, the Declaration requires 
Bayside to set a “reasonable” rate for water considering 
“among other things, its cost of . . . the equipment necessary.”  
According to the complaint: “Bayside breached its obligations 
to [the Condominium Association] by refusing to continue to 
provide water treatment and wastewater treatment services at 
rates determined in accordance with the Declaration”; the 
Water Supply Agreement resulted in TSG charging “rates far 
in excess of historical rates”; TSG refused to provide water 
treatment in accordance with its obligations under the 
Declaration unless the Condominium Association paid “an 
arbitrarily set charge for said services”; and the fixed $0.05 
rate was an unreasonable rate designed to extort funds from 
the Condominium Association in excess of what the 
Declaration allowed. 
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 As for the second argument, the Declaration states that 
each member is individually responsible for paying water 
charges, but the Water Supply Agreement requires the 
Condominium Association to collect water charges from the 
members as a common charge. 
 The District Court did not address these arguments.  
Rather, it found that the Water Supply Agreement was not 
ultra vires because the Condominium Association was 
authorized to enter into the Agreement.  In doing so, the 
District Court did not recognize that the authority of the 
Condominium Association’s Board of Directors is narrower 
than the authority of the Condominium Association as a 
whole.  See, e.g., Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1133–
35 (Del. 1990) (finding a corporation’s board of directors 
lacked the authority to issue stock with special voting rights 
because the certificate of incorporation did not grant them 
such authority, even though the corporation was authorized to 
do so).  Therefore, we will remand so the District Court can 
determine whether the Board was, in fact and law, authorized 
to execute the Water Supply Agreement. 
B 
 The Condominium Association also argues that the 
District Court should have allowed additional discovery on 
the ultra vires argument.  In light of our decision to remand 
the case, we agree that additional discovery is warranted.  The 
District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part 
by relying on the affidavit of Myron Poliner, a Board member 
of the Condominium Association.  In doing so, the District 
Court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).  Therefore, the 
District Court was required to “provide[] notice of its 
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intention to convert the motion and allow[] an opportunity to 
submit materials admissible in a summary judgment 
proceeding.”  Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 
930 F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  Of 
course, if no prejudice accrued from the District Court’s 
failure to do so, it would be harmless error.  Id. at 285. 
 Because the District Court conflated the authority of 
the Board with the authority of the Condominium 
Association, it is unclear whether it concluded that Poliner 
had the authority to sign the Water Supply Agreement on 
behalf of the Condominium Association as a whole, or merely 
on behalf of the Board.  Regardless of how we read the 
District Court’s opinion, the Condominium Association is 
entitled to conduct additional discovery and submit materials 
on the question of whether the Water Supply Agreement was 
beyond the authority of the Board. 
 If the District Court relied on Poliner’s affidavit to 
conclude that he had the authority to sign the Water Supply 
Agreement on behalf of the Condominium Association as a 
whole, then it committed reversible error because that issue is 
the crux of this entire case.  Therefore, the Condominium 
Association is entitled to “an opportunity to submit materials 
admissible in a summary judgment proceeding.”  See Ford 
Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 284–85; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 
 If, on the other hand, the District Court concluded 
merely that Poliner was authorized to sign the Water Supply 
Agreement on behalf of the Board, its error would be 
harmless because the Condominium Association’s own 
complaint acknowledges as much.  Of course, as we have 
explained, such a conclusion begs the question as to whether 
the Board was authorized to sign the Water Supply 
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Agreement on behalf of the Condominium Association as a 
whole.  Additional discovery would still be required on that 
question, which is the dispositive issue in this case.4
We next address the District Court’s finding that the 
Condominium Association’s coercion claim was arbitrable.
 
IV 
5
                                                 
4 Appellees raise two procedural challenges to the 
Condominium Association’s discovery request.  First, they 
argue that the Condominium Association waived its discovery 
request because it did not request discovery with respect to 
the arbitration clause specifically.  We disagree because the 
Condominium Association made the request “to adequately 
refute the claims asserted by Beachside Associates, LLC in its 
motion to dismiss,” which contained a request for arbitration.  
Second, Appellees argue that the Condominium Association 
is estopped from seeking discovery because it asserted below 
that arbitrability is a legal question.  Appellees’ argument 
misreads the Condominium Association’s argument below, 
which was that the Condominium Association was entitled to 
have the arbitrability issue decided by the District Court 
before the case could be sent to arbitration, not that the 
Condominium Association was entitled to have the 
arbitrability issue decided without reference to facts.  
Therefore, the Condominium Association is not estopped 
from seeking discovery. 
 
  
5 Appellees argue that the Condominium Association 
waived its coercion argument.  We disagree because the 
Condominium Association alleged coercion in its complaint.  
The District Court understood that the Condominium 
Association raised a coercion argument, and addressed it.  
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Although we have never squarely addressed whether coercion 
claims are arbitrable, we drew a distinction in Sandvik 
between claims that a contract is void, which are not 
arbitrable, and claims that a contract is voidable, which are 
arbitrable.  See 220 F.3d at 106–07.  Because coercion 
renders a contract voidable rather than void, see Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 7, cmt. b., Sandvik suggests that the 
Condominium Association’s coercion claim is arbitrable. 
 The question is not so straightforward, however, 
because it is unclear whether the void/voidable distinction we 
noted in Sandvik survived the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decision in Buckeye Check Cashing.  There, the Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that the application of the Prima 
Paint rule depends on state law distinctions between void and 
voidable contracts.  546 U.S. at 446.  Rather, the relevant 
distinction is between challenges to a contract’s validity, 
which are arbitrable, and challenges to a contract’s formation, 
which generally are not.  Id. at 444 n.1; see also Granite 
Rock, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2855–56.  Indeed, Buckeye Check 
Cashing itself held that a challenge to a contract’s legality 
was arbitrable, even though illegality would have rendered 
that contract void rather than voidable.  546 U.S. at 442, 449.  
On the other hand, Buckeye Check Cashing left open the 
question whether mental capacity challenges to a contract are 
arbitrable, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1 (citing Spahr v. Secco, 330 
F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that an Alzheimer’s 
patient’s mental capacity challenge could be decided by a 
                                                                                                             
Therefore, the argument was not waived.  See Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of 
course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an 
issue not passed upon below.” (emphasis added)). 
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court)), even though mental capacity challenges render 
contracts voidable rather than void.  See Weird by Gasper v. 
Estate of Ciao, 556 A.2d 819, 824 (Pa. 1989); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7, cmt. b (challenge 
based on infancy). 
 Even under the Buckeye Check Cashing formulation, 
however, the Condominium Association’s coercion claim is 
arbitrable because it is a challenge to the validity (rather than 
the formation) of the Water Supply Agreement.  The 
Condominium Association’s coercion claim is that TSG 
threatened to stop providing it with a service unless it 
consented to the assignment and agreed to pay a higher price.  
Although such economic duress implies that the 
Condominium Association’s Board was bargaining from a 
position of weakness when it signed the Water Supply 
Agreement, it does not mean that the Condominium 
Association’s capacity to consent was so diminished that no 
contract was ever formed or that the Condominium 
Association was necessarily unable to consent to the 
arbitration clause.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (upholding arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts of adhesion).  Therefore, we hold that the 
Condominium Association’s coercion challenge is arbitrable.6
                                                 
6 However, if the District Court on remand finds that 
the Board lacked the authority to enter into the Water Supply 
Agreement in the first place, any disagreement about whether 
the Water Supply Agreement was coerced would be moot. 
  
This holding accords with both of the federal appellate courts 
to have squarely considered the issue.  See Simula, Inc. v. 
Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[F]raud in 
the inducement and economic duress of the 1995 Agreement 
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as a whole . . . are questions for the arbitrator.”); Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 
398 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff’s claim that “she was distracted 
and coerced by the high pressure sales talk of the Merrill 
Lynch representatives,” id. at 394 n.2, was arbitrable). 
V 
 Finally, to assist the District Court on remand, we 
address the Condominium Association’s argument that there 
is an inconsistency between the Consent to Assignment, 
which referenced a “Water Supply Agreement between . . . 
Bayside and the COA dated August ____, 2005” and the 
Water Supply Agreement attached to Bayside’s motion, 
which was “dated June ____, 2005.”  We agree with 
Appellees that the Condominium Association is judicially 
estopped from pursuing this argument.  In a prior proceeding 
before the Virgin Islands Superior Court, the Condominium 
Association attached the same Water Supply Agreement 
dated June 2005  to its complaint in which it averred that 
“two agreements [were] signed in August 2005 . . . COA 
Water Supply Agreement . . . dated ‘June __, 2005’ [sic]” 
(emphasis added).  Having alleged in another legal 
proceeding that the June 2005 date on the Water Supply 
Agreement was merely a typographical error, the 
Condominium Association is estopped from arguing 
otherwise in this case.  See Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 
675 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2012). 
*  *  * 
 The Condominium Association has raised a bona fide 
question as to whether its Board possessed the authority to 
enter into the Water Supply Agreement.  Because this 
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question goes to the formation of the contract rather than its 
validity, it requires a judicial determination.  Accordingly, we 
will vacate the order of the District Court and remand for 
additional discovery regarding that question.  Also, for the 
reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s holding that 
the Condominium Association’s coercion claims are 
arbitrable. 
